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Abstract 
Shale gas emerges as a new and important source of energy for the post - industrial world. It is assumed that countries that have 
considerable shale deposits will be better placed in the 21st century competition between states. The United States have  one of  
biggest deposits of shale gas, underscores a domestic production “boom” and is on the verge of becoming a gas exporter in 
Western Europe. The United States still has few capabilities to export shale gas to Europe. It would have to build new 
liquefaction facilities to do that. On the other side, Russia is, for the moment, the energy giant of Europe, its massive exports of 
natural gas to the area, acting as a powerful political leverage especially on the eastern and central European space. But in 
Europe, at least 10 countries are believed to hold significant shale gas reserves; among them, Romania is assumed to have huge 
unconventional gas reserves, whose exploitation could ensure its medium-term energy independence, and combined with newly 
discovered gas in the Black Sea, and energy efficiency improvement measures, provide not only the energy independence but 
transform Romania into a regional power pole. 
The interesting fact is how each country in Europe, will choose to convert resources in shale gas reserves and to exploit them to 
the benefit of the economy, the society and the environment. Besides some clear positive effects (decreasing energy imports, 
creating a stronger negotiating position against external (fossil fuel) suppliers and diversifying Europe’s energy mix) will shale 
gas extraction succeed to decrease  gas bill for population, by reducing prices, or will it stick only to royalties and fees collection, 
as well as with some local social and economic effects,  with the consequence of prolonged pollution or even potentially 
devastating effects on the environment?  In order that gas-gas competition begins to act effectively and exert a strong competitive 
pressure on gas import prices in Europe (by changing their base and weaken the link with oil prices, up to a possible decoupling 
of it) it is necessary that Europe will benefit from a big inflow of gas supplies, shale gas included, from different sources than 
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Russia. This goal requires large investment in large infrastructure projects enabling EU countries access to diverse sources of 
supply, as well as in interconnections, allowing dissemination of gas within the Union. 
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1. Introduction 
The highly volatile world oil and gas prices over the past few years have renewed concerns about the security, 
reliability and affordability of energy supply worldwide. Global energy markets have become more sensitive to 
geopolitical events, regardless the energy sector. The supply of main primary energy sources (oil, gas, coal) is 
becoming more and more concentrated in a few number of countries, with different degrees of political instability 
and unpredictability. The risk that the Exporting Countries Forum Gas could become an OPEC like cartel and the 
steady increase in oil and gas prices have stimulated searches for the discovery of unconventional gas alternative 
reserves and U.S. boom in shale gas production has been a major challenge and stimulus for European countries in 
an attempt to replicate the American experience. This paper aims to carry out the U.S. model analysis, its  
application limits in Europe, and the advantages and disadvantages of shale gas exploitation in Romania. 
1.1. The shale gas experience in USA 
USA is the most successful experience, worldwide, in shale gas extraction, although resources and interest in 
shale gas exploration/exploitation have been identified also in other areas/countries worldwide, such as Canada, 
Argentina, Brazil , Mexico, China , several countries in Europe and Africa. The main factors that have ensured the 
boom in U.S. shale gas industry were: a long  experience in exploration and exploitation of gas, which have led to 
big progress in extraction technologies; relatively low population density in the target areas, which allowed for some 
intensive drilling operations on large areas;  ownership of underground resources is 90% in private property, which 
encouraged private landowners to support the development of shale gas; a diversified, strong and very competitive 
energy sector coupled with a strong service industry; a relaxed system of regulation and tax incentives ; a fully 
liberalized market , which facilitated the companies access to pipelines capacities, in order to sell their gas. 
According to a "Cambridge Energy Research Associates” (CERA) report, the main benefits to the American 
economy , of shale gas “revolution" were: a sharp decrease in the price of gas, about 3.5 times during 2008-2013 
period, at a level 3 to 4 times lower  in comparison with the European price of gas from Russia long term export-
import contracts;  gas bill reduction to final consumers; creation of approximately 800,000 new jobs until 2011 with 
the possibility of doubling their number, by 2035;  reducing dependence on massive LNG imports available at 
substantially higher costs; restoring competitiveness of U.S. chemical industry, thanks to shale gas inputs  on the one 
hand and lower costs of electricity , on the other hand ; contribution of $ 18.6 billion in 2010 and of $ 57 billion 
(estimated) in 2035, to U.S. GDP ; positive impact on industrial production ,expected to rise by 2.9%, towards 2017, 
as a result of lower energy costs. 
Beyond the clearly positive results in terms of energy security and socio-economic effects, more frequently 
reactions appear in US mass-media, about the negative consequences of hydraulic fracturing use, including 
revelations about deliberately overestimate, and even illegal, of yield and volume of their deposits, the potentially 
destructive nature of " fracturing economy" on the environment and especially, about unprofitable nature of the 
exploitation of these reserves. In 2012, two American consultants warned, in Petroleum Review, the leading journal 
of the British oil industry about "doubtful reliability and durability of U.S. shale gas deposits"  and that industrialists 
forecasts have been favored by the new rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the federal body 
control financial markets. These rules,adopted in 2009, actually authorizes companies to assess the amount of 
reserves, at will, without an independent verification. On the other hand, they concluded that "extraction devours 
capital with stunning speed, leaving a mountain of debt, while production falls". Arthur Berman, a geologist who 
worked for the company "Amoco" was surprised by the "incredibly high pace of deposits exhaustion”: in the first 
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year of production the well yield diminishes with 60-90 %, so to get stable results, operators will have to drill 
"almost a thousand additional wells each year in the same location”. 
 
1.2. Shale gas exploitation in Europe. Comparison with USA 
 
The rapid expansion of the US shale gas sector stimulated the interest for shale gas development in other regions 
possessing shale deposits, particularly in European Union countries, concerned by the prospect of decreasing 
economic competitiveness, mostly of industrial one, as against USA. From a theoretical point of view EU has at 
least three strong reasons to start turning into account its shale gas resources: the presumed existence of big 
resources; reduction of massive dependence on gas imports from Russia, which for many states, mostly from eastern 
and central european area, represent the single gas supplier; creating a strong competitive pressure on Russian gas in 
order to induce a price decrease. Nevetheless it has become increasingly clear, that direct extrapolation of  North 
American experience to EU space, does not appear to be realistic, because of the large differences in geological, 
economic, social and regulatory conditions. 
The main disadvantages for Europe, as compared with U.S. shale gas exploitation are: less favorable geological 
structure , deposits of shale gas on the European continent  being  located at greater depths (3000-4000 m) so the gas 
is more difficult to extract; high population density, so that opposition to obtain exploitation licenses may be 
stronger than in U.S.A, where the immensity of space and resources have permitted that exploration focus 
predominantly on areas less vulnerable in terms of environmental restrictions and with low population density; low 
number of drilling equipment and specialized personnel, coupled with very limited experience in operating gas shale 
(hydraulic fracturing capacity and the number of drilling equipment in Europe is 80 times lower than in the U.S); 
underground resources are the exclusive property of national governments, discouraging private initiatives; EU gas 
market and pipeline infrastructure is still largely controlled  by large companies that dominate the EU energy sector; 
EU gas imports are becoming increasingly diversified in a situation of lower gas prices; the shale gas potential in the 
EU is generally estimated as moderate, possibly compensating for declining indigenous conventional production; 
EU shale gas exploitation will also be more expensive than US shale gas from the above mentioned reasons. 
The environmental externalities of current extraction technologies for shale gas are often viewed as the main 
threat to the future of the shale gas industry. The most important environmental concerns regarding shale gas 
production are related to water resources availability, particularly to: large freshwater demand, a critical issue for the 
EU, where water availability per capita is relatively low; contamination risk of underground and surface freshwater 
by hazardous chemicals, which are used as fracturing agents, and/or with heavy metals and radioactive elements 
mobilized by fracturing water; wastewater handling, treatment and disposal.  
Apart from water, other potential environmental problems entailed by industrial exploitation of shale gas include: 
impact on biodiversity and natural conservation; noise pollution; worsened local air quality; the risk of enhancing 
seismic movements due to hydraulic fracturing or injection of large volumes of wastewater. Emissions of 
greenhouse gas are higher than for conventional gas, but lower than coal. However, concerns about security and the 
need to diversify energy supply, is putting an increasing pressure on EU to encourage the exploration /exploitation 
of shale gas in its area, but under strict compliance with environmental conditions and by recognizing the right of 
each country to choose the type of resources to develop.  
1.3. Shale gas development in Romania. Pros and cons (arguments)  
According to US “Energy Information Administration” estimates, Romania holds some 1.4 billion cubic meters 
of recoverable wet shale gas, making it the third-largest deposit in Europe after Poland and France. This could 
potentially turn Romania into  one of the biggest gas producers in South-East Europe, and provide the country’s 
domestic consumption of gas for another 100 years. 
Amongst the main arguments in favor of exploration/exploitation of shale gas in Romania we can mention: 
• Advanced degree of depletion of current proven reserves of natural gas, calculated at a rate of 87 % , which is 
equivalent to a lifetime of 10 years at the current rate of consumption and another 6 years to probable reserves; 
•Assumed existence of significant resources of shale gas ; 
• Ensuring independence from gas imports delivered from a single source, Russia; 
• The foreseeable increase of domestic consumption. Based on projections of " Romanian Energy Strategy 2011-
2035" gas consumption will increase during the forecast period , while the share of gas imports in total consumption 
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could reach a level of 40-50 % in 2035, (as compared to 22-25 % currently ) in the absence of new discoveries. 
• Reducing opportunities for accessing external sources of gas, mainly due to the cancellation of the Nabucco gas 
pipeline project, which was initially considered one of the main hopes for energy independence from Russia, not 
only for Romania; 
• The spillover economic and social effects (regional development, employment, budget revenues, economic 
potential); 
 • The prospect of gaining access to gas in terms of lower prices compared to the current import price from 
Russia. 
• The optimistic considerations of oil and gas industry specialists as far as the environmental risks derived from the 
use of fracturing technology, in their opinion exclusively related to the application mode not to the technology in 
itself. 
 
The main arguments against the exploitation of shale gas in Romania are: 
• Excessive politicization of the exploitation of shale gas, an objective that must be addressed not only from the 
country's energy needs perspective, but also from the environment goals and especially on a thorough cost / benefit 
analysis;  
• The exploitation is expected to be made in a concession regime. The lease provides that while resources remain 
in state ownership, production belongs to investors, in exchange for a payment of some royalties and fees to the host 
state (rather modest in Romania, under the present fiscal system). The state is not involved in financial investment, 
but it has no rights neither on the production nor on its final destination. 
• Lack of transparency of the Romanian public authorities as for granting the exploration license, 
• Regulatory shortcomings :  The Petroleum Law nr.238/2004 does not refer explicitly to unconventional gas, but 
merely defines the concept of conventional gas; for granting exploration license to Chevron it used  a trick, 
including  unconventional gas, without legal basis, in the large conventional gas category. 
• Existing exploration agreements  do not provide clear responsibilities regarding compliance with the national 
interest, as stipulated in the Petroleum  Law of 2004 and the Constitution of Romania, which provides: restoration 
and protection of environment , ecological balance , creating the conditions for increased quality of life, the pursuit 
of regional development, in line with the European Union provisions. 
• The absence of an EU legislation governing the specific conditions for hydraulic fracturing best practices in 
shale gas exploitation; 
• Lack of independent national and  international analyses on the environmental, economic, social and production 
of unconventional gas (shale gas).The Regulatory Authority for Mineral Resources, ANRM (Romania) has 
approved the exploration of shale gas before the completion of such a study on unconventional gas; 
• Although, theoretically, the exploitation license should be granted separately from exploration, through auction, 
there are suspicions that it would have been awarded to Chevron, together with the exploration license; 
•The recovery factor for unconventional gas deposits is very low, of about 15-20 % , or even lower, of 3-10 % (as 
compared to 80% in case of conventional ones), so  the necessary volume of exploitable resources must be 
considerable, as well as the area of land allocated to exploration/exploitation. This can cause strong soil degradation 
during operations, affecting agricultural potential, up to the desertification of land. 
• Water is an essential resource for  shale gas extraction, while in the concession areas Bārlad - Vaslui, Bihor , 
Dobrogea, water is highly deficient. Moreover, in Romania, water is a poor resource, the urban deficit being of 
almost 70%. The process of hydraulic fracturing, which uses huge amounts of water in the process could lead to 
depletion of water resources in areas leased.  Ensuring water requirement involves pressure on the ecosystem and 
the adjacent communities. Wastewater post-industrial treatment requirements are not adequately defined. 
• Although the chemical composition of the fracturing fluid is not specifically known, the toxicity potential is 
very high. U.S. media informed about many cases of irreversible contamination of drinking water, air and soil, as a 
result of the fracturing hydraulic fracturing use. The presence of permeable faults zones favor communication with 
regional aquifers that can be contaminated and irreparably damaged. 
• Shale gas is causing carbon emissions and noise pollution 
• Dangerous activation of surface seismic faults in blocks located near the Vrancea seismic zone, the area with 
the highest seismic potential in Europe. In addition, Dobrogea already has a nuclear plant and wind generators parks 
so that exploitation of shale gas, especially near the Black Sea coast, could be an additional factor of ecological and 
economic imbalance that can jeopardize coastal tourism . 
533 Mariana Papatulica /  Procedia Economics and Finance  8 ( 2014 )  529 – 534 
• The price at which the company "Chevron" will sell the gas to the Romanian state raises a lot of questions. It is 
for sure that it will not be lower than the present price, on the contrary it will be aligned to the balance price level in 
Europe (possibly discounted by an amount equivalent to the difference in the transport fees) for two reasons: the 
high investment costs for shale gas extraction in general, and the European Commission decision according to 
which, Romania will have to liberalize the domestic natural gas price, up to 2018. This will require aligning the 
domestic gas price to the European average import price, a measure which will entail a strong increase in gas prices 
( by about 160 % from current levels ). 
In these circumstances, one can ask what will be Romania’s advantages from the exploitation of its own 
resources ? Will shale gas extraction succeed to decrease the gas bill for the population, or the benefits will be 
limited only to the collection of fees and royalties, with the implied local spillover effects- social and economic- and 
the consequence of a prolonged pollution or even potentially devastating effects on the environment? It is already 
known that the strong argument in favor of shale drilling has been built around the idea of acquiring  the “energy 
independence " and the (illusory) promise of lower gas prices for the population. The reality is that, for the moment 
being, the exploitation of unconventional resources (shale gas, in particular) is not profitable, even in the U.S., 
where costs are bigger than gas prices, and much less in Europe because of the institutional and several demographic 
and geological conditions.  
In fact, the price of gas will rise, whether shale operation will be done or not, the main reason being the need for 
liberalizing the market. Regarding this, some clarifications are required. First, in case of natural gas, there is not an 
international market like that of crude oil. Gas is traded through a variety of contracts, at prices set by bilateral 
negotiations, on the basis of confidential, preferential clauses, economic and political. Secondly, under perfect 
competition conditions, liberalization means higher offer, lower prices, better services to consumers. (e.g. U.S. , UK 
and Australia). EU countries, including Romania, remain  prisoner of the system imposed by Russia, under which, 
the export price of gas is not directly determined  by  market conditions (the marginal cost of production, the long 
term supply-demand report, the balance of power between buyers and sellers)  but indirectly by indexing the price 
with that of  crude oil. The gas price indexation according to oil price will tend to lose its economic rationale, in the 
medium term as Europe will have access to more and more external sources of gas. 
U.S. gas market model invoked by Romanian authorities, as an positive example is far from being taken as a 
benchmark: it is characterized by very high liquidity and very low prices resulted from the development of its huge 
resources and inflows of cheap gas from neighboring countries, all providing premises for developing inter-fuel 
competition. Gas market reform undertaken in the '80s led to a fully liberalized market, with appropriate functional 
mechanisms, which contributed to a highly developed spot and term markets. On the contrary, European gas 
markets, heavily dependent on imports, because of poor resources, are still dominated by the system of long-term 
contracts at prices indexed to that of oil, have a much more inflexible structure, liberalization started much later and 
is still imperfect, and liquidity is much lower compared to the U.S. market. 
In these circumstances, one can assume that, in the best case, Chevron will sell the gas to the Romanian state at a 
price level only 15-25% lower than the average import of Europe, that is the import prices from Russia, discounted 
by the margins charged by intermediary firms, who sell the Russian gas to Romania, and a difference in the 
transmission tariff. In order that gas-gas competition start acting effectively by weakening the link with oil prices, 
(going to a possible decoupling of it) it is necessary that gas supplies from sources different from Russia, including 
shale gas, increase significantly. If until a few years ago, it was assumed that a competitive gas market, with a 
multitude of operators will not occur easily in any one region of Europe, due to poor access opportunities to new 
sources of gas mainly because of the lack of adequate infrastructure, nowadays the paradigm of domination and 
absolute dependence on Russian gas is seriously threatened by the prospect that a lot of gas will enter Europe from 
many sources, at lower prices.  
These new potential sources of gas are: shale gas from Poland - Romania - Ukraine, provided the amount of 
proven reserves are large enough to have an impact on a European scale; the gas discovered in the Black Sea coasts 
of Romania, Bulgaria , Ukraine; the  gas from Azerbaijan, delivered through the Trans -Adriatic pipeline (TAP) , 
which annulled the Nabucco project, as well as from other Caspian states (Turkmenistan , Uzbekistan ) ; huge gas 
discoveries in the eastern basin of the Mediterranean (Israel , Cyprus ) ; Iran's huge reserves  which are likely to 
reach the market in a medium time perspective as a result of the agreement concluded between Iran and the six 
major world powers ;  Iraq’s reserves, currently kept aside the market by the geopolitical interests of the U.S., 
promoting the interests of allied countries such as Qatar ; the world's liquefied natural gas surplus ; Romania's 
involvement in a number of projects included in the Eastern route, East gas pipeline that can provide access 
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resources in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, as well as the transmission and transit cluster for the implementation of 
the reverse flow of gas from outside Romania, the development of Romania's capacity to export natural gas. 
 
Conclusions 
 
• Regardless of the economic, environmental and social challenges associated with current shale gas technologies 
and developments, shale gas - and unconventional gas in general - is increasingly expected to play an ever larger 
part in global gas supply; 
• Europe is not being expected to become a large prospective shale gas player before 2035 due to a number of 
techno-economic, environmental, social and political challenges, although in some EU Member States exploration 
activity is already significant.  
• Very important to the development of a European shale gas industry will be the issue of how to resolve key 
environmental and social concerns. Certain issues already facing the shale gas industry in North America may prove 
to be even more challenging in Europe due to higher population densities, water and other resources shortage, and 
the higher sensitivity of local populations to large-scale industrial developments. 
• Shale gas will be an important source of energy for Romania, subject to strict environmental rules and to 
ensuring economic benefits for Romania. 
• For Romania, the development of shale gas should not have the purpose to be released from the energy 
dependence from Russia, and to suddenly become energy independent, but to address this goal as part of the more 
complex concept of energy security, which is a sustainable energy solution. 
• The objective of Romania's energy independence should be achieved through a mix of policies including import 
gas sources diversification, energy efficiency measures, intake of new energy, such as renewable energy. In order to 
achieve this goal, Romania will have to complete the European gas network interconnection as a main tool to gain 
access to new gas sources and to real competition. 
 
References 
Berman, W., 2012.„Shale gas will be the next bubble to pop”,Oil price, USA, 12 November, http://oilprice.com/; 
Kavalov, B., Pelletier, N., 2012. Shale Gas for Europe-Main Environmental and Social Considerations, Report EUR 25498, EC, JRC Scientific 
and Policy Reports, 2012, p. 8-17; 
Murray, J., King, D. , 2012. „Climate policy: Oil’s tipping point has passed”, Nature, nr. 481, London, 26 January; 
Nafeez M., A.,, 2013. Gazul de şist–marea escrocherie, Le Monde Diplomatique, 10 aprilie; 
Richter, W., 2012. Dirt cheap natural gas is tearing up the very industry that’s producing it”, Business Insider, Portland, 5 iunie; 
Rogers, R., 2013. Unconventional gas in Europe: Frack to the future- Extracting Europe’s shale gas and oil will be a slow and difficult business, 
Revolt, 12 March ; 
Rund W., McCredie, C., 201.„Inflating US shale gas reserves”, Petroleum Review, Londra, Jan.. 
Van Renssen, S., 2013. EU gets powerful mandate to regulate shale gas, Energy Post, June 11, 2013; 
CERA, 2011,The Economic and Employment contributions of shale gas in the US,IHS CERA, dec.2011; 
Comunicarea Comisiei Europene, 2012, "Energie 2020 - Strategie pentru o energie competitivă , durabilă şi sigură" (COM(2010) 639 final) din 
10 noiembrie 2012; 
Erste Group Research, 2012, Shale Gas in Europe; Poland and Ukraine as pioneers, Global Strategies, 5 March; 
European Parliament, Resolution of 21 November 2012, on industrial, energy and other aspects of shale gas and oil (2011/2309(INI)). 
